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Sympathy and Similarity: The evolutionary dynamics of 
cooperation 
 
 
The advantage of mutual help is threatened by defectors, who exploit the benefits provided by 
others without providing benefits in return. Cooperation can only be sustained if it is 
preferentially channelled towards cooperators and away from defectors. But how? A 
deceptively simple idea is to distinguish cooperators from defectors by tagging them. It 
clearly is in the interest of  cooperators to use some distinctive cue to assort with their like. 
Such an assortment, however, conflicts with the interests of the cheaters, who have every 
incentive to also acquire that tag. This makes for an inherently unstable situation. The history 
of evolutionary thinking on this issue is long. A recent paper by Antal et al. (1) opens new 
ground by providing an in-depth analysis of a selection-mutation model.  
 
The first to investigate a tag for altruism was W.D. Hamilton (2). He conceived what he called 
a super-gene, able to produce (a) a distinctive phenotypic trait, (b) the faculty to recognize the 
trait in others, and (c) the propensity to direct benefits towards bearers of that trait, even 
though this entails a fitness cost. Soon afterwards, Richard Dawkins described Hamilton’s 
thought experiment by using as phenotypic trait the fanciful example of a green beard. The 
super-gene was now termed ‘green beard gene’, in part to acknowledge its inherent 
unlikelihood. ‘Too good to be true’, were Dawkins’ words (3): for the gene would have to be 
able to programme for three effects, namely the feature, its recognition and the altruistic 
propensity. 
 
The green beard concept relates to both major approaches to cooperation in evolutionary 
biology, namely kin selection (2) and reciprocal altruism (4). It helps in promoting assortment 
between cooperators; as a result, cooperators can get more than they give, so that altruism 
becomes a thriving business.  Since wearers of green beards both confer and receive benefits, 
the tag works as a kind of promise that the altruistic action will be returned -- not necessarily 
by the recipient, but by another member of the green bearded guild. In this sense, the green 
beard mediates an indirect form of reciprocation, through third parties. In the usual models of 
indirect reciprocity, ‘good guys’ are recognised by their reputation, which is based on their 
past deeds (5).  Here, however, recognition is ensured by a phenotypic trait, which is a less 
sophisticated (and possibly less reliable) signal. 
 
Mostly, the green beard is studied in the context of kin selection. If you carry a green beard, 
your relatives are likely to carry one too. Directing benefits at green bearded individuals 
confers the benefits preferentially to your kin, and raises your indirect fitness (since your kin 
shares your genes with a higher-than-average probability). In many cases, kin are living close 
by. But the viscosity of the population (to use another term due to Hamilton) is not enough to 
guarantee a local increase in cooperation, since it is counterbalanced by a local increase in 
competition. Limited dispersal alone is therefore not enough. A gene for kin recognition can 
help to direct positive rather than negative effects towards relatives. But it is important to 
realise that the green beard can promote altruism beyond the realm of the family. 
 
Some ten years ago, it was found that green beards are not as implausible as their name 
suggests. In particular, Haig suggested that genes for homophilic cell adhesion could perform 
all three tasks required from a green beard gene – trait, recognition, and action – by coding for 
a surface protein that allows them to stick to copies of themselves on other cells (6). A few 
years later, it was found that csA genes in Dictyostelium discoideum fit the bill (7). In hard 
times, these amoeba literally stick together to form stalks for dispersing their spores. A similar 
gene has also been discovered in flocculating yeast cells (8).  Other candidates for more 
sophisticated green beard effects have been found in ants and lizards. 
 
An obvious way to cheat is to grow a green beard but skip the altruism. For homophilic cell 
adhesion, this seems barely feasible. In other examples, cheating may be prevented by genetic 
constraints. But in principle, one would expect that a tight link between a gene for altruistic 
behaviour and a gene for tag recognition will ultimately be broken, and cooperation be 
destroyed. Surprisingly, it turned out that if the link is not too tight (but not too loose either), a 
dynamic regime of cooperation can emerge, based on tag diversity. Whenever some tag 
becomes too frequent, it can be faked by defectors, but cooperative behaviour subsists 
nevertheless, by allying itself with another tag. This phenomenon has been termed ‘beard 
chromodynamics’, to suggest that green beards can over time be replaced by red, or blue, or 
yellow beards as rallying signals for cooperators (9,10).  
 
The underlying principle is that of a shibboleth, or secret handshake. But such a specially 
contrived trait, evolved for the purpose of signalling cooperation, is not always necessary.  
Tag-based cooperation can also rely on self-similarity. All that is needed is some general 
means to recognise what is like yourself and what is not, i.e., to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’. 
With familiars, you need no badge, or password. This has been called ‘armpit effect’ (by 
Dawkins again, see (3)). While an obvious variation of the green beard principle could 
mediate, in principle, symbiosis between two different species, the armpit effect is self-
referential. You need not sprout a special recognition device but simply check whether the 
other looks, or smells, or sounds like you.  
 
Mechanisms based on self-similarity are commonly used among cells of an organism,  
or among members of a species. Kin-recognition seems widespread: it is useful, not only for 
promoting nepotism, but also for avoiding incest (11). Bats or birds recognize their offspring 
on crowded cave-roofs and cliff-faces through vocalizations, hamsters and wasps pick up the 
odour of their nest or colony, etc. Interestingly, these faculties seem always acquired through 
imprinting, rather than genetically encoded. Thus they indicate in-group rather than kin. This 
use of associative learning is well supported by theory (12).   
  
An armpit effect has been recently found in hamsters (13). Self-similarity appears to work in 
humans too: we like our like. Neat economic experiments show that players preferentially 
trust similar-looking co-players (14). (The players are provided with pictures of their 
ostensible partners, and these photos are manipulated to look to a greater or lesser degree like 
themselves). Clearly, such cues for self-similarity can be enhanced by cultural means. Many 
groups provide their members with characteristic uniforms, badges, tattoos, ties, hair-cuts, 
hang-outs, accents, musical tastes, or slang idioms.   
 
In most tag-based models, the tags are discrete – you either look like me or you don’t. 
In general, defectors can be overcome only for a restricted range of recombination between 
tag and behaviour, cf. (15,16,17).However, similarity is likely to be a question of degree – 
you can look more or less like me. In the case of continuous graduation, it is likely that 
cooperative behaviour is addressed towards all those who are tolerably similar.  
Such models show intriguing patterns:  cliques of similar cooperators grow, are beset and 
undermined by defectors, and re-group around other phenotypes (18,19). Extending tolerance 
to a larger range of tag-values enlarges the basis of collaboration, whereas restricting 
tolerance shields from exploiters: this leads to endlessly fluctuating ‘tides of tolerance’ (20). 
 
 
In the model of Antal et al (1), members of a well-mixed population of constant size N are 
distinguished by a tag which can take infinitely many values and is coded by integers. 
Defectors help nobody, and cooperators provide help exclusively to members of their own 
tag-group. From time to time, individuals produce offspring in numbers proportional to their 
fitness. Some N of these offspring are randomly chosen to form the next generation. Offspring 
inherit from their parent both  their behaviour (cooperator or defector) and their tag, up to 
mutation. Each configuration of the population is specified by the number of defectors and 
cooperators for each tag. The expected payoff values for defectors and cooperators can easily 
be computed in terms of conditional probabilities (e.g., for defectors to interact with 
cooperators, etc.). This specifies the configurations for which cooperators are sufficiently 
assorted with other cooperators to earn more than defectors do. But the configurations move 
and cluster in a very fluid manner through the range of possible tags. It needs considerable 
mathematical dexterity to average the payoffs over all configurations, in the stationary state. 
This yields, under the limiting assumption of weak selection, a condition for cooperators to be 
more frequent than defectors in the long-term, requiring that the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds 
a specific threshold. Under the most favourable conditions, i.e., when mutations between tags 
are frequent and mutations in the behaviour rare, that threshold is slightly larger than 2. In 
contrast to previous models (9,15,16), no additional requirements on spatial population 
distribution are used. The analysis of several limiting cases shows that the results depend 
significantly on mutation structure, about which empirical data is lacking at present.  The 
elusive nature of the game of hide-and-seek between cooperators and defectors, an age-long 
spur for biological and cultural evolution, continues to challenge experimentalists and 
theoreticians alike. 
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Fig: Face transitions. Players in a game theoretic experiment are provided with pictures of 
their partners who, through digital sorcery, are made to look like themselves, to a greater or 
lesser extent. Here, the face in the middle is the result of a 60:40 mix of the other two faces. 
Players preferentially trust co-players who look more like themselves. Thus familiarity 
enhances trust. With kind permission from Lisa DeBruine, see (14). 
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